The AUCO Czech Economic Review, Vol. 4, No. 1
10/03/2010
A new issue of the AUCO Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:
Articles
Voting Weights or Agenda Control: Which One Really Matters?
Hannu Nurmi
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 5-17
Machiavelli’s Possibility Hypothesis
Manfred J. Holler, Alain Marciano
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 18-31
Game-Theoretic Modeling of Electricity Markets in Central Europe
Martin Hrubý, Petr Čambala, Jan Toufar
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 32-61
Public Utilities: Privatization without Regulation
Ornella Tarola
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 62-78
Downward Wage Rigidities in Slovakia
Pavel Gertler, Matúš Senaj
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 79-101
Policy discussions
Bata Management System: A Built-In Resilience against Crisis at the Micro Level
Milan Zelený
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 102-117
Reports
International Conference on Multilevel Governance and Democracy in the EU
Frantisek Turnovec
AUCO Czech Economic Review 4 (1), 118-118
To view, download, or recommend a single article, click on the article title. To unsubscribe, please fill in the form in the left column (Table of Contents Alert) on the journal homepage.
Statistics
31/12/2009
Last two years (2008 and 2009)
- 33 accepted (25 international, 8 local)
- 22 rejected (16 international, 6 local)
- Overall acceptance rate: 59% (32/54)
- International acceptance rate: 61% (25/41)
- Local acceptance rate: 57% (8/14)
- Share of international articles out of accepted articles: 76% (25/33)
- Share of local articles out of accepted articles: 24% (7/32)
- Share of international referees: 83% (72/87)
- Share of local referees: 17% (15/87)
Last year (2009)
- 18 accepted (13 international, 5 local)
- 10 rejected (5 international, 5 local)
- Overall acceptance rate: 64% (18/28)
- International acceptance rate: 72% (13/18)
- Local acceptance rate: 50% (5/10)
- Share of international articles out of accepted articles: 72% (13/18)
- Share of local articles out of accepted articles: 28% (5/18)
This list does not include 28 articles that are currently under review (21 international, 7 local). We consider a paper to be local if affiliation of any of the author is institution located in the Czech Republic. Otherwise, it is classified as an international article.
JEL Codes
30/12/2009
For the prospective authors, it may be of interest to see the most frequent JEL codes in the journal:
BY PRIMARY CODE
C Mathematical and Quantitative Methods: 30
D Microeconomics: 24
H Public Economics: 16
E Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics: 11
F International Economics: 7
G Financial Economics: 7
J Labor and Demographic Economics: 7
BY SECONDARY CODE
C7 Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: 14
D7 Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: 14
C6 Mathematical Methods and Programming: 5
D8 Information, Knowledge and Uncertainty: 5
E5 Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: 4
E6 Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: 4
H1 Structure and Scope of Government: 4
Congratulations
29/12/2009
We cordially congratulate Tapio Palokangas (University of Helsinki, HECER) for being the first author in the AUCO Czech Economic Review whose article has been viewed more than a 1000 times on this webpage. The paper Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Immigration has been released early in 2008 in 2(1) issue of the journal.
The AUCO Czech Economic Review, Vol. 3, No. 3
31/10/2009
A new issue of the AUCO Czech Economic Review is available online. See table of contents:
Editorial
Editorial
Vito Fragnelli, Guido Ortona
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 205-206
Articles
Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining
Norman Schofield; Ugur Ozdemir
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 207-242
The Propensity to Disruption for Evaluating a Parliament
Vito Fragnelli
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 243-253
Ranking Electoral Systems through Hierarchical Properties Ranking
Lorenzo Cioni
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 254-269
Simulating Party Competition and Vote Decision under Mixed Member Electoral Systems
Susumu Shikano
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 270-291
Simulating Voting Rule Reforms for the Italian Parliament: An Economic Perspective
Stefania Ottone; Ferruccio Ponzano; Roberto Ricciuti
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 292-304
Electoral Systems and Government Stability: A Simulation of 2006 Italian Policy Space
Luigi Curini; Paolo Martelli
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 305-322
Reports
SING5. The 5th Spain, Italy, Netherlands Meeting on Game Theory
Frantisek Turnovec
AUCO Czech Economic Review 3 (3), 323-323
To view, download, or recommend a single article, click on the article title. To unsubscribe, please fill in the form in the left column (Table of Contents Alert) on the journal homepage.
Featured article of the forthcoming issue
14/10/2009
Formal Models of Elections and Political Bargaining
Norman Schofield
Washington University
Ugur Ozdemir
Washington University
Abstract: The key theoretical idea in this paper is that activist groups contribute resources to their favored parties in response to policy concessions from the parties. These resources are then used by a party to enhance the leader’s valence — the electoral perception of the quality of the party leader. The equilibrium result is that parties, in order to maximize vote share, will balance a centripetal electoral force against a centrifugal activist effect. Under proportional electoral rule, there need be no pressure for activist groups to coalesce, leading to multiple political parties. Under plurality rule, however, small parties face the possibility of extinction. An activist group linked to a small party in such a polity has little expectation of influencing government policy. The paper illustrates these ideas by considering recent elections in Turkey, Britain and the United States, as well as a number of Euopean polities.
Keywords: Election, plurality rule, proportional representation, activist groups
JEL classification: H10, H11
Most visited articles at journal homepage
07/10/2009
Downloads
(175) Stastna, Lenka: Spatial Interdependence of Local Public Expenditures: Selected Evidence from the Czech Republic, AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3 (1)
(172) Behar, Alberto: Tax Wedges, Unemployment Benefits and Labour Market Outcomes in the New EU Members, AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3 (1)
(155) Gregor, Martin; Rohac, Dalibor: The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control, AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3 (1)
(144) Galeotti, Elisa: Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Geographic Proximity with Foreign Investors? Evidence from the Privatization of the Czech Glass Industry, AUCO Czech Economic Review, 3 (1)
(129) Hruby, Martin: Algorithmic Approaches to Game-theoretical Modeling and Simulation, AUCO Czech Economic Review, 2 (3)
Abstract views
(916) Palokangas, Tapio: Self-Interested Governments, Unionization, and Legal and Illegal Migration, AUCO Czech Economic Review 2 (1)
(903) Mallozi, Lina; Tijs, Stef: Partial Cooperation and Non-Signatories Multiple Decision, AUCO Czech Economic Review 2 (1)
(877) Denisova, Elena; Garnayev, Andrey: Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches, AUCO Czech Economic Review 2 (1)
(783) Gregor, Martin; Tuchyna, Peter: Centralization Tradeoff with Non-Uniform Taxation, AUCO Czech Economic Review 1 (3)
(772) Koller, Wolfgang; Luptáčik, Mikuláš; Mahlberg, Bernhard; Schneider, Herwig W.: Growth and Employment Potential of Chosen Technology Fields, AUCO Czech Economic Review 2 (1)
Notes: Abstract views at our homepage are counted immediately since the article gets published. Downloads have been counted since March, 2009.
Hits in last 3 months (LogEc)
06/10/2009
Call for articles into Policy Discussion section
06/10/2009
The introduction of a special Policy Discussion section has taken place in the most recent issue, where as promised we present a first article entitled “Monetary Policy Strategies before Euro Adoption: The Art of Chasing Many Rabbits.” Therein, Juraj Antal (Czech National Bank) and his coauthors deal with the long-lasting policy issue of monetary policy tradeoffs in a country prior to euro adoption.
In the policy discussion section, we shall review articles on a slightly different basis than regular articles: A candidate topic primarily has to be of current policy interest, must deliver policy recommendations (or address ongoing policy puzzles), and maintain a strong link to academic literature, especially in terms of empirics. This is arguably a challenging task, hence we expect to publish articles including a maximum of one single policy discussion per article. We invite authors to come up with original articles for this growing segment.
Most downloaded article at RePEc (LogEc)
05/10/2009
| Rank | Article | Downloads | Abstract views | |
| 1 | Neokeynesian and Neoclassical Macroeconomic Models: Stability and Lyapunov Experiments, Jan Kodera, Karel Sladký and Miloslav Vosvrda | 49 | 189 | |
| 2 | National, Political and Institutional Influence in European Union Decision Making, Frantisek Turnovec | 42 | 135 | |
| 3 | Exchange Rate Arrangements Prior to Euro Adoption, Juraj Antal and Tomas Holub | 39 | 159 | |
| 4 | Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches, Elena Denisova and Andrey Garnaev | 37 | 270 | |
| 5 | Credit Risk and the Finnish Economy, Petr Jakubik | 36 | 104 | |
